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11 Introduction
Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) urge the use of general equilibrium methods to assess
the eﬀects of labor market programs, especially those with a large target population.
Sharing this view, this paper ﬁrst develops an empirically justiﬁed general equilibrium
model of the labor market that distinguishes passive and active labor market policies
(LMPs). Since the theoretical analysis often leads to ambiguous eﬀects of these policies
on employment, the paper also simulates the model.
A lot of research has been devoted to the analysis of the microeconomic inﬂuence
of unemployment compensation systems and active labor market policies (ALMPs) (see
Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991, Pedersen and Westergard-Nielsen, 1993, OECD, 1993,
Calmfors, 1994, Katz and Krueger, 1995, Fay, 1996, for surveys). Much less eﬀort, as
argued by Calmfors and Lang (1993) and Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999), has
been devoted to the measurement of the general equilibrium or macroeconomic eﬀects of
these labor market policies. Yet this literature is growing. We make here no pretense
at a comprehensive survey. What follows is a selective and highly condensed review of
some important contributions. First, some authors have tried to assess to what extent
the economic position of the non participants is changed by the existence of a program.
Abandoning the traditional approach of regressing employment among the non partici-
pants on a program indicator, Davidson and Woodbury (1993) use a partial equilibrium
matching model to assess the eﬀect of reemployment bonus programs on the ineligible
workers. Surveys have also been used to measure this impact (see e.g. OECD, 1993, and
Van der Linden, 1997a).
Second, some sophisticated general equilibrium analyses have been developed where
the link between labor market policies and wage formation has been emphasized (see
e.g. the theoretical papers of Holmlund and Lind´ en, 1993, Calmfors and Lang, 1993,
1995). Broadly speaking, two eﬀects go in opposite directions : A direct eﬀect of ALMPs
(they are supposed to maintain eﬀective labor-force participation) and an indirect one
(these policies typically reduce the disutility of being laid oﬀ and this increases wage
pressure; on the latter phenomenon, see also the recent empirical analysis of Forslund and
Kolm, 2000). Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) develop and calibrate an equilibrium search
model to compare European and US labor market institutions in the presence of skilled-
biased technological shocks. To measure the impacts of a national tuition-reduction policy,
Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998) develop and simulate an overlapping-generations
general equilibrium framework with endogenous wages for the various skills.
Third, there is a quite large econometric literature where typically a matching func-
tion or a Beveridge curve is augmented with some labor market policy indicators (see e.g.
Haskel and Jackman, 1988, Jackman, Pissarides and Savouri, 1990, Edin and Holmlund,
1990, Boeri and Burda, 1996 and Dor, Van der Linden and Lopez-Novella, 1997). This
approach is only based on the matching function and lacks good theoretical foundations.
Moreover, this approach only provides an estimation of the parameters of interest condi-
tional on the vacancy (or the unemployment-vacancy) level. Yet, the main message of the
recent theoretical literature is that labor market policies can have important eﬀects on
this level. Furthermore, in many countries, the reliability of the vacancies registered by
Employment Agencies is rather dubious. They are not necessarily representative of the
actual number of vacancies in the economy.
These drawbacks motivate the current research eﬀort. We ﬁrst develop an equilibrium
2job search model that draws upon Pissarides (1990) and Holmlund and Lind´ en (1993). In
this model, LMPs turn out to have clear-cut eﬀects on tightness on the labor market. Van
der Linden and Dor (2000) exploits this property in order to specify an econometric model
for the exit rate out of unemployment (which is a monotonous transformation of tightness).
The estimated parameters are in line with the eﬀects predicted by the theoretical analysis.
Moreover, the estimation results conﬁrm that the net impact of LMPs can be very diﬀerent
as soon as the number of vacancies is endogenous. However, the direction of the eﬀect
of LMPs on the unemployment exit rate and the one on the employment rate can be
diﬀerent. For instance, Van der Linden and Dor (2000) conclude that the rate of training
has a negative eﬀect on the hiring rate of non-participants. Since the eﬀect on participants
turns out to be favorable (Cockx and Bardoulat, 1999), the net eﬀect on employment
remains an unsettled issue. This is typically also true for other LMPs. To throw light on
the impact of LMPs on employment, this paper simulates the model. The calibration is
based on information about structural parameters collected for Belgium.
As the lower part of Table 1 shows, Belgium is broadly characterized by relatively
low poverty rates but also by persistent unemployment, a large share of long-term un-
employment and rather poor employment performances. Among other things, Marimon
and Zilibotti (1998) highlight that Belgium should have idiosyncratic characteristics that
explain the latter. This paper is also a contribution towards a better understanding of
these characteristics. We here only focus on LMPs. A more comprehensive analysis can be
found in Van der Linden (1997b). As far as ALMPs are concerned, there is a long tradition
in Belgium of direct job creation for the unemployed, also called ‘relief jobs’ (see Table 1).
The eﬀort put into training has substantially increased but is still relatively lower than in
many North-European countries. In comparison with the same countries, the replacement
ratio is not particularly large. This ratio is fairly stable during the nineties. The rules
which determine the disqualiﬁcation for beneﬁt are an other important feature of any com-
pensation system. The rate of sanctions has sharply increased since 1990. Considering the
nineties, this paper evaluates the impact on employment of a change in the replacement
ratio, the rate of sanctions and the rate of entry into ALMPs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model. Section 3
is devoted to the numerical simulation. Section 4 concludes the paper.
INSERT TABLE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE.
2 Job matching, labor market policies and equilibrium em-
ployment
2.1 The model
This section extends the equilibrium matching model to the case where four labor market
states are distinguished: Insured unemployment, uninsured unemployment, programs and
employment. The two ﬁrst states are distinguished in order to emphasize the role of
sanctions on the equilibrium employment rate. The third state identiﬁes the formerly
unemployed who are in active labor market programs (‘relief jobs’ or manpower training).
So, the employment state should be understood as ‘regular’ employment.
This model draws upon Holmlund and Lind´ en (1993) who consider three sates : Un-
employment, the programs and ‘regular’ employment. Assume a continuous-time setting.
3Due to various imperfections and heterogeneities that are not explicitly introduced in the
model, the matching process is not instantaneous. So, the ﬂow of hires, H, is a function of
an indicator of the number of job-seekers, S, and the number of vacancies, V . The aggre-
gate matching function writes : H = h(S,V ). It is assumed to be increasing, concave and
homogeneous of degree 1. S is not simply the sum of the number of insured unemployed,
U, the number of program participants, R, and the number of uninsured unemployed, X.
All these jobless workers are presumably not equivalent as far as the matching process is
concerned. So, S has to weight the various types of workers. To this end, each type of
job-seeker receives a speciﬁc ‘eﬀectiveness parameters’ ci,i = u,r,x. These parameters
do not only summarize diﬀerences in terms of search behavior. The perception of ﬁrms
can be important, too (see e.g. the assumption of ‘ranking’ introduced by Blanchard and
Diamond, 1994). Let us assume that the parameters ci’s are exogenous (we come back to
that issue at the end of this section). With these notations, the number S of job-seekers
is cuU + crR + cxX in ‘eﬃciency units’.
The assumptions about the relative value of the ci’s should be clariﬁed at the outset.
If these parameters intend simply to capture the amount of time people devote to job
search activities, we could expect that cr ≤ cu. Yet, remember that the matching func-
tion implicitly encompasses the “heterogeneities frictions and information imperfections”
(Pissarides, 1990, p. 3) present on the labor market. Program participants are arguably
better informed about job opportunities than those in ‘open unemployment’. For, as they
are employed in public and non-proﬁt organizations, they are presumably well aware of
‘regular’ job opportunities in these institutions. Similarly, the trainees can be in contact
with ﬁrms (or are even trained by them). In addition, there is some evidence that training
schemes improve human capital or signal more productive workers. So, our preferred as-
sumption is cr ≥ cu but we keep aware that the alternative assumption could be relevant,
too.
The assumption about cx is also controversial. The uninsured unemployed could re-
ject less oﬀers because their reservation wage must be lower or they could search more
intensively. However, there is a growing evidence that the unemployed turn down very
few oﬀers (see e.g. Devine and Kiefer, 1991). Moreover, it has been argued that compared
to non-claimants “beneﬁt claimants maintain a closer attachment to the labour market
and appear more able to prolong search eﬀort” (Wadsworth, 1991). Furthermore, in our
model, the individuals on which sanctions are imposed are on average de facto unem-
ployed for a longer duration than the insured unemployed. Then discouragement and/or
a ranking of job-applicants according to their unemployment duration can explain why
their eﬀectiveness parameter is lower (see Calmfors and Lang, 1995, in a related context).
For these various reasons, we adopt the assumption cu >c x > 0 but keep in mind the
alternative assumption, too.
The labor force is made of an exogenous number L of individuals (L ≡ E+U +X +R,
where E denotes ‘regular’ employment). e,u,x and r denote the rates obtained by dividing
the levels by L (e.g. e ≡ E
L). Let θ ≡ V
S . θ is a measure of the tightness of the labor
market. The rate at which vacant jobs become ﬁlled is q(θ) ≡ H/V = h(1
θ,1),q (θ) < 0.
An ‘eﬃcient job-seeker’ moves into employment according to a Poisson process with rate
α(θ) ≡
h(S,V )
S = θq(θ), with α (θ) > 0. Figure 1 summarizes the ﬂows between the
four states. The arrival rate of job oﬀers is cuα for an insured unemployed worker, cxα
for an uninsured unemployed and crα for a program participant. As will soon be clear,
these oﬀers are accepted. Each match in the regular segment is assumed to end at an
4exogenous rate φ. Any worker whose job is terminated is assumed to be eligible for UI.1
To enter a program, a jobless worker has to transit into the insured unemployed state.
This assumption ﬁts the Belgian rules rather well. γ denotes the exogenous arrival rate
of program oﬀers. A program ends at an exogenous rate λ. It is plausible to assume that
λ ≥ φ.2 Finally, there is a limited duration of entitlement to UI. UI recipients have their
beneﬁt terminated at an exogenous rate π. In that case, they are entitled to a (lower)
assistance beneﬁt for an indeﬁnite duration. Once UI beneﬁt is exhausted, a worker must
be hired before he becomes eligible again. In accordance with stylized facts in Belgium,
uninsured unemployed have no access to programs.3
INSERT FIGURE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE.
In a steady state, the ﬂows between the four states are such that e,u,x and r are
constant. These conditions lead to the following expressions :
(crα(θ)+λ)r = γu, (1)
φ(1 − u − r − x)=α(θ)(cuu + crr + cxx), (2)
cxα(θ)x = πu (3)
Equations (1), (2), (3) and the identity e ≡ 1−u−r−x determine e,u,x and r as a function
of θ.I f ∆ ≡ [(cuα(θ)+π + φ)(crα(θ)+λ)+γ(crα(θ)+φ)]cxα(θ)+φπ(crα(θ)+λ) the
following expressions deﬁne e,u,x and r:
e =[ ( cuα(θ)+π)(crα(θ)+λ)+γcrα(θ)]cxα(θ)∆−1, (4)
u = φcxα(θ)(crα(θ)+λ)∆−1, (5)
x = φπ(crα(θ)+λ)∆−1, (6)
r = φγcxα(θ)∆−1. (7)
1Since it will turn out that workers have no incentive to quit, φ should be interpreted as an exogenous
ﬁring rate. It is assumed that laid-oﬀ workers receive UI beneﬁts. This assumption could be relaxed at
the cost of some additional complexity,which would not really further our present purpose. In the Belgian
context which underlies this analysis,only 5% of claimants are judged to be ineligible to UI beneﬁts during
the nineties.
2Casual observations for Belgium indicate that training schemes typically last a few months. The
duration of relief job spells seems to be very heterogeneous. Some of them have a clear-cut duration
(around a year),others are not necessarily very diﬀerent from regular jobs. As far as the latter are
concerned,Cockx,Van der Linden and Karaa (1998) analyze a sample of Belgian employees hired after a
spell in unemployment. The ﬁrst quartile duration of a worker with average characteristics is estimated to
be 14 months,suggesting a quite large average duration of completed job spells. Hence,on average,the
assumption λ ≥ φ should be satisﬁed.
3Other papers have introduced sanctions or a limited duration of entitlement in general equilibrium
models. See Atkinson (1995),Ljungqvist and Sargent (1995),Fredriksson and Holmlund (1998),Cahuc
and Lehmann (2000) and Boone and van Ours (2000).
5These relationships are the ﬁrst basic component of this model. It can be checked that
the employment rate is an upward-sloping function of tightness θ.
θ is determined by the behavior of ﬁrms and workers. Assume that ﬁrms are homo-
geneous and that each of them has only one job. The ﬁrm’s discounted expected return
from an occupied (respectively, vacant) job is denoted Πe (respectively Πv). Let δ be the
discount rate of the workers and the ﬁrm, y the constant marginal product of a ﬁlled va-
cancy, wc the cost of labor and k the ﬁxed cost of a vacant job per unit of time (k captures
the cost involved in posting a vacancy, searching for applicants and selecting them). Still
assuming a steady state, Πe and Πv satisfy the following conditions :
δΠe = y − wc + φ(Πv − Πe), (8)
δΠv = −k + q(θ)(Πe − Πv). (9)
In equilibrium, vacancies are opened as long as they yield a positive expected return.
Therefore, the equilibrium condition for the supply of vacancies is Πv = 0. Using (8) and
(9), this equilibrium condition can be rewritten as follows:




This relationship, the ‘vacancy-supply curve’, is the second basic component of this model.
This optimality condition says that the marginal product of a ﬁlled vacancy should be equal
to the wage cost plus the expected capitalized value of the hiring cost. Conditional on
y,δ,φ and k, equality (10) deﬁnes a downward-sloping relationship between the wage cost
and θ.
Assume risk-neutral workers. Let Ve, Vu, Vx and Vr denote the present-discounted
value of the expected income stream of, respectively, an employed worker, an insured
unemployed, an uninsured unemployed and a program participant. Assume that payroll
taxes are levied at a rate t : wc ≡ w(1 + t). In equilibrium, where the wage rate, w,i s
the same everywhere, the four expected lifetime incomes can be deﬁned by the following
equalities :
δVe = w + φ(Vu − Ve), (11)
δVu = bu + cuα(Ve − Vu)+γ(Vr − Vu)+π(Vx − Vu), (12)
δVr = br + crα(Ve − Vr)+λ(Vu − Vr), (13)
δVx = s + cxα(Ve − Vx), (14)
where bu, br and s denote respectively the unemployment beneﬁt, the beneﬁt/earnings
of program participants and the assistance beneﬁt. We assume that these beneﬁts are
proportional to wages. Let ρu, ρr and σ be the corresponding replacement ratios (ρu ≡ bu
w ,
6ρr ≡ br
w and σ ≡ s
w). The choice of these beneﬁt levels has to be incentive compatible. It
can be checked that Ve >V r >V u >V x if cr ≥ cu >c x > 0 and 1 >ρ r ≥ ρu ≥ σ ≥ 0.4
If a job terminates, the ﬁrm and the worker will have to engage in a costly search
process before they can meet another partner. This gives rise to a rent that has to be




β (Πe − Πv)
1−β , (15)
with 0 <β<1. The ﬁrst-order condition can be written as :
y − wc =
1 − β
β
(Ve − Vu)(δ + φ)(1 + t). (16)
The negotiated wage is a negative function of the diﬀerence in expected value between
employment and insured unemployment. One has to solve equations (11) to (14), to
substitute the diﬀerence Ve − Vu into (16). This diﬀerence can be written as Ve − Vu =
wf(α(θ),Z) where f(α(θ),Z) is deﬁned as :
(δ + cxα)[(1 − ρu)(δ + crα + λ)+γ(1 − ρr)] + π(δ + crα + λ)(1 − σ)
(δ + cxα)[(δ + crα + λ)(cuα + φ + δ)+γ(crα + φ + δ)] + π(δ + crα + λ)(φ + δ + cxα)
,
(17)
with α = α(θ) and Z ≡ (δ,cu,c x,c r,γ,λ,φ,π,ρ u,ρ r,σ) . It can be checked that
∂f
α < 0i f





This expression deﬁnes a ‘wage-setting curve’ relating the wage cost to θ. This curve is
upward-sloping if k is unrelated to wc. Figure 2 illustrates the three equilibrium rela-
tionships (4),(10) and (18) when k is a constant. The lower segment shows the steady
state relationship (4) between the employment rate e and tightness θ. The upper segment
shows the upward-sloping wage-setting curve (18) and the downward-sloping vacancy sup-
ply curve (10). From (10) and (18), the payroll tax rate does not inﬂuence the wage cost
nor the equilibrium level of tightness θ. Hence, given (4), the payroll tax rate does not
inﬂuence the employment rate either.6
INSERT FIGURE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE.
4If cr was lower than cu,the incentive compatibility constraints would require additional restrictions
upon ρr − ρu and ρr − σ.I f Vr <V u,it could still be argued that the public employment services can
actually impose the acceptance of a relief job or a training oﬀer by the unemployed. However,if Vr is
lower than Vu because cr is low compared to cu (and cx),the notes under Table 2 will illustrate that
increasing the rate of entry into programs can have a negative impact on the equilibrium employment rate.
For similar reasons,restrictions should be imposed on ρu − σ and ρr − σ if cx was greater or equal to cu.
5By assumption,wages can be renegotiated at any time. So,whatever his previous state on the labor
market,the fallback level for a worker is the position of insured unemployment.
6This result is no more general as soon as individual working time and/or leisure time are added to the
model.
72.2 Comparative statics
In Table 2, we look at the eﬀects of the ‘labor market policies parameters’ γ,λ,π,ρu,ρ r
and σ and the ‘structural parameters’ of this economy cu,c x,c r,φ,δ,k,β,y . The second
column gives the sign of the eﬀect on the ‘employment curve’ (4). The third column is
devoted to the ’wage-setting curve’ (18). The fourth is concerned with the ‘vacancy supply
curve’ (10). From the eﬀects on the two latter curves, the inﬂuence on the equilibrium level
of tightness θ is seen in the ﬁfth column. This and the shift of the ‘employment curve’
(column 2) lead to the change in the equilibrium employment rate (the last column).
Unambiguous conclusions are reached in the case of the replacement ratios. They only
inﬂuence wage bargaining, in such a way that the higher the replacement ratio, the lower
the employment rate. Table 2 shows that the net eﬀect on the equilibrium employment rate
of the other labor market policies is ambiguous under the assumptions cr ≥ cu >c x > 0
and 1 >ρ r ≥ ρu ≥ σ ≥ 0. For instance, increasing the rate of participation into programs
(γ) has a favorable direct eﬀect on the employment rate, given θ. Yet, improved prospects
in case of unemployment lead to an increase in the bargained wage cost. This indirect
eﬀect reduces the equilibrium vacancy-job searchers ratio θ. Hence, the net eﬀect cannot
be signed unambiguously. The conclusion is the same in the case of an increase in the rate
of sanctions, π, yet for opposite reasons. The indirect eﬀect is now a reduction of the wage
cost because the expected income stream is lower in case of unemployment. But the direct
eﬀect is unfavorable. Conditional on θ, a higher π means more uninsured unemployment
(with worse employment opportunities) and less insured unemployed and trainees (with
better employment opportunities). Some of the ambiguous net eﬀects in Table 2 could
be signed by assuming a relatively low value for cr, a relatively high value for cx and
suﬃciently diﬀerent replacement ratios. Then, raising γ would unambiguously decrease the
equilibrium unemployment rate and conversely raising π would unambiguously boost the
equilibrium employment rate. However, we have explained above why these assumptions
are not the most plausible ones. Alternatively, the ambiguous net eﬀects in Table 2 could
be signed by a numerical simulations. The next section will develop such an approach.
INSERT TABLE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE.
In Table 2, the structural parameters have typically a clear-cut net eﬀect on the em-
ployment rate. Increasing the rate of job termination, the discount rate, the cost of
opening vacancies or the relative bargaining power of the worker reduces the equilibrium
employment rate. An improvement in the ‘eﬀectiveness parameters’ cu,c x or cr has on the
contrary ambiguous eﬀects on the employment rate. The direct eﬀect is favorable, yet the
indirect one leads to higher wages and a lower equilibrium value for θ.
Up to now we have assumed that each of the exogenous structural parameters and
labor market policy parameters could be modiﬁed without aﬀecting the others. This is
questionable. It is for instance often admitted that an increase in the rate of sanctions or
a more limited duration of entitlement will enhance the probability that an unemployed
person exits from unemployment to employment. Recent microeconometric evidence sup-
porting this assertion can be found in e.g. Carling, Edin, Harkman and Holmlund (1996)
and Abbring, van den Berg and van Ours (1999). Fredriksson and Holmlund (1998) de-
velop a theoretical model similar to ours where search intensity is endogenous. They show
that the equilibrium level of search of the insured unemployed increases with π through
an eﬀect on θ. So it could be argued that an increase in π leads in a way or another to a
8higher parameter cu. Moreover, Fredriksson and Holmlund (1998) show that the equilib-
rium level of search of the uninsured unemployed decreases with π if the discount rate is
suﬃciently low. In these examples, the assumed interactions introduce more complexity.
Combining the results summarized in Table 2 and these interactions does not allow to sign
the net eﬀect of those policy changes on the employment rate.
3A numerical simulation for Belgium
The section aims at calibrating the model for Belgium in order to simulate the net eﬀects
of γ and π on the equilibrium employment rate e. Moreover, we intend to measure the
magnitude of the negative eﬀect of the replacement ratios on e. Only the impact of ρu
will be considered here.
3.1 Calibration
We take the month as the unit of time. As far as possible, the values of the parameters
are based on observed data for the nineties. We choose 1997 as a reference.7 There
are administrative data about the average level of beneﬁt paid out to the unemployed
and about assistance beneﬁts. These data and the estimated average net wage allow
to ﬁx ρu to 0.34 and σ to 0.23. The state R measures participation in active labor
market programs (merging relief jobs and manpower training). Those in training receive
a beneﬁt that is marginally higher than the unemployment beneﬁt. On the contrary,
those in relief jobs typically are paid the same wage as ‘regularly’ employed workers in
similar occupations. On the basis of this information, we are able to estimate an average
replacement ratio for those taking part to active programs: ρr =0 .65. Published data
also allow to ﬁx the monthly sanction rate π at 0.01. The appendices of the OECD’s
Employment Outlook display the inﬂows into active labor programs. This information is
exploited to set γ =0 .05.
There are no reliable data on the rate of entry into unemployment (φ) nor about the
rate at which active programs end (λ). Nevertheless, there are administrative data about
the number of full-time insured unemployed for less than three months. This information
implies that φ should be larger than 0.013. Incomplete information about ﬂows between
training programs and insured unemployment suggest that λ should be higher or equal to
0.04. These bounds are used below.
As many other papers, let us assume a Cobb-Douglas matching function. We take
h(S,V ) ≡ CS0.6V 0.4, where C is a parameter. These hypotheses are supported by pre-
vious empirical analyses at the aggregate level (see Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2000).
Consequently, the hiring rate of any category i, ciα(θ) equals ciCθ0.4, ∀i ∈{ u,r,x}. C is
therefore a scaling factor that allows to normalize cu to 1. Parameters C,cx and cr are
then chosen jointly with φ and λ in the following way. First, we set δ =0 .008.8 Second,
we take the 1997 values of E,X,U,R and L. According to administrative data, the cor-
responding rates are e =0 .835,u =0 .125,r =0 .03,x =0 .01. These values are plugged
in equations (4) to (7) in order to ﬁnd the value for θ and to ﬁx parameters φ and λ.
Doing so, we keep the following constraints in mind: φ>0.013 and λ>0.04. Moreover,
7The years close to 1993 were deeply aﬀected by the major recession of the nineties. The last years of
this decade were clearly Van dresse a boom. Moreover,some of the data are then lacking.
8We also considered the value δ =0 .004 and found less reasonable parameters.
9plausible values for the (imperfectly observed) stock of vacancies are used as an additional
qualitative target. It turns out that reasonable values for φ and λ require that cr and cx
be close to cu. Henceforth, we take cr =1 .05,c x =0 .95,λ=0 .042,φ=0 .031,C =0 .35.
With these parameters, θ =0 .14. The relative value for cr sounds plausible. Cockx and
Bardoulat (1999) provide an unbiased estimator of the eﬀect of training programs in the
southern part of Belgium. For those who have completed the training scheme, they con-
clude that the selected average treatment eﬀect is 1.6. The evidence about relief jobs is
less robust. Ignoring selection on unobservables, Mahy (1994) concludes that participation
in relief jobs has an unfavorable eﬀect on the probability of entering ‘regular jobs’. Since
the share of trainees in the stock of participants in active programs is less than one-third,
the relative value of cr is reasonable.
The vacant job costs per unit of time, k, are assumed to be proportional to the marginal
product of a ﬁlled vacancy, y. Then, except for the wage rate, the major steady-state
properties of the model are independent of the value of y. Let κ ≡ k
y. Then, combining
(10) and (18), it can be checked that the equilibrium value of θ solves the following implicit
equation :




Taking θ =0 .14, this equation allows to ﬁx the bargaining power β as a function of κ.
It turns out that only high values of κ are compatible with plausible values of β. This
phenomenon is not new (see Wasmer, 1999, and Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999, who
introduce training costs in addition to screening costs). So, we assume κ = 1. Then,
β =0 .77 solves (19).
3.2 The response of the employment rate to labor market policy shocks
For the values of the parameters adopted in the previous section, let us consider changes
in the sanction rate π, the rate of entry into active programs γ and the replacement ratio
for the insured unemployed ρu. We only focus on the net impact on the employment rate
e. The simulations throw light on three issues. From Section 2, we know that θ increases
with π and decreases with γ and ρu. Under the hypothesis that cx <c u ≤ cr, the net
eﬀect of a rise in π on the employment rate is however analytically ambiguous. In our
numerical example, cx is only 5% lower than cu. Whether such a small diﬀerence would
be suﬃcient to compensate the eﬀect on θ is a ﬁrst interesting question. Second, cr is
only 5% higher than cu: Is this suﬃcient to compensate the unfavorable eﬀect of γ on θ?
Finally, we know that the employment rate is a negative function of ρu. Yet, the strength
of the relationship is an interesting issue.
As Figure 3 shows, large variations in the sanction rate π only have a minor impact
on tightness. This result is in accordance with the conclusions in Van der Linden and Dor
(2000). With cx 5% lower than cu, the net eﬀect on employment is negligible. These con-
clusions clearly are at odds with micro-econometric evaluations of sanctions by Abbring,
van den Berg and van Ours (1999). These authors found a large eﬀect of sanctions on the
exit rate of the treated. Clearly, if cx was suﬃciently higher than cu, our model would
lead to qualitatively similar conclusions as those of Abbring, van den Berg and van Ours
(1999). There is therefore a clear need for more microeconometric analyses of the eﬀect
of sanctions.
10Figure 4 is concerned with the impact of γ. Compared to the previous ﬁgure, the
impact on equilibrium tightness is more substantial. Yet, even large shocks on γ do not
have a dramatic eﬀect on θ. Moreover, a small favorable eﬀect on the participants (here,
cr =1 .05) is suﬃcient to compensate this impact. The employment rate is indeed not
much aﬀected by γ.
The impact of the replacement ratio ρu on θ is shown in Figure 5. Compared to the
two previous cases, the sensitivity of θ with respect to ρu appears to be more important.
As expected, the net eﬀect on e is negative but the relative change is clearly not large.
The intuition behind the latter result can be found in equation (4). The rate at which
an ‘eﬃcient job-seeker’ enters ‘regular employment’, α(θ), is an increasing function of θ
(with an elasticity of 0.4). This rate appears both in the numerator and the denominator
of equation (4). Therefore, it should be expected that e is less aﬀected by ρu than θ.
INSERT FIGURES 3, 4 AND 5 APPROXIMATELY HERE.
4 Conclusion
There is a clear need for evaluation that deals with indirect eﬀects of labor market policies
on wages and other economic indicators. To face the challenge of a better integration
between theory and empirical analysis, we have ﬁrst developed a theoretical general equi-
librium model of the labor market. In this model, the unemployment-vacancy ratio is
endogenously determined by a set of structural and labor market policy parameters. By
assumption, those who are in active programs have a better ‘matching eﬀectiveness’ than
the insured unemployed and the opposite holds for those who are sanctioned. The equilib-
rium job search model leads to the conclusion that policies that improve the intertemporal
prospect of being unemployed lead to a wage-push eﬀect and eventually to less vacancies
per job-seeker (measured in eﬃciency units). However, most of the labor market policies
have an ambiguous net eﬀect on the equilibrium employment rate because policies that
lead to more (less) vacancies also deteriorate (improve) the composition of the pool of
those who search for a ‘regular job’ (i.e. an occupation which is not speciﬁcally created for
the unemployed). Only the replacement ratio has a clear negative inﬂuence in this model.
It has therefore been calibrated and shocks to various labor market policy indicators have
been simulated.
The major conclusion of the simulations is that passive and active labor market policies
would not have a substantial net impact on the employment rate. This conclusion holds
for Belgium where the average ‘matching eﬀectiveness’ of the insured unemployed, the
uninsured unemployed and those in active programs apparently do not diﬀer much. These
minor diﬀerences are suﬃcient to compensate the net eﬀects of the sanction rate and the
rate of entry into active programs on wages and on the number of vacancies.
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14Programs (expenditure) 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Public employment services 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.20 0.19
Labor market training 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.29
Direct job creation (*) 0.79 0.55 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.47
Subsidies to ‘regular employment’ 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.16 0.28 0.15
Total active measures 1.35 1.23 1.21 1.23 1.25 1.37 1.42 1.50 1.29
Average replacement ratio (**) 40.0 35.4 34.5 33.9 34.6 33.9 34.0 34.9 34.3
Annual frequency of sanctions (‡) 5.7 8.4 14.4 11.4 16.4 12.5 12.3 14.7 12.0
Poverty rate (EU criterion)(‡‡) 6.0 6.7 6.9
Employment rate (†) 53.1 54.7 56.1 56.8 56.3 56.0 56.6 56.6 57.3
Unemployment rate 10.3 6.7 6.6 7.3 8.9 10.0 9.9 9.7 9.2
Long-term unemployment (††) 69.2 68.2 62.8 59.0 52.9 58.3 62.4 61.2 60.5
Table 1. Expenditures on active labor market programs (% of GDP) and basic labor
market indicators (%): Belgium.
Source: Expenditures on labor market programs: MET (1999); Labor market indicators :
European-Commission (1997).
(*) public or non proﬁt sectors : ‘relief jobs’.
(**) In %. The replacement ratio measures the ratio between the average unemployment
beneﬁt and the average net wage (both measured per head). See the appendix of Van der Linden
and Dor (2000).
(‡) In %. The numerator measures the annual ﬂow of full-time insured unemployed who are
no more entitled to unemployment beneﬁts. The series of disqualifying reasons include voluntary
separation from work, unavailability for a job or an active labor market policy, refusal of a suitable
job oﬀer, misconduct during unemployment (e.g. undeclared paid work), non compliance with the
administrative rules and unemployment for an ‘excessive’ duration. The denominator is the stock
of able-bodied unemployed (entitled to unemployment beneﬁts) measured at the end of June. See
the appendix of Van der Linden and Dor (2000).
(‡‡) Centrum voor Sociaal Beleid, UFSIA, Universiteit Antwerpen, Belgium.
(†) % of working age population.
(††) Share in the stock (in %).
15parameter e(θ)* wage curve* vacancy supply* equilibrium θ** equilibrium e**
γ +˚ +˚˚ 0 - ?˚˚˚
λ - † - †† 0 + ? †††
π - ‡ - ‡‡ 0 + ? ‡‡‡
ρi,i= u,r 0 + 0 - -
σ 0 + 0 - -
ci,i= u,r,x + + 0 - ?
φ - + - - -
δ 0 + - - -
k 0 + - - -
β 0 + 0 - -
y 0 0 + + +
* ‘+’ (respectively, ‘-’, ‘0’) ≡ given θ, the function increases (respectively, decreases, remains
unchanged) as the corresponding parameter (in column 1) increases.
** ‘+’ (respectively, ‘-’, ‘?’) ≡ the equilibrium value increases (respectively, decreases, moves in a
direction that cannot be predicted) as the corresponding parameter (in column 1) increases.
˚i fcr <c x and cr <c u, this sign is negative.
˚˚ if cr <c x and cr <c u, this sign could become negative if ρr was suﬃciently close to ρu and σ.
˚˚˚ if cr <c x and cr <c u but the positive eﬀect on the wage curve is maintained, this sign is
negative.
† if cr <c x and cr <c u, this sign is positive.
†† if cr <c x and cr <c u, this sign could become positive if ρr was suﬃciently close to ρu and σ.
††† if cr <c x and cr <c u but the negative eﬀect on the wage curve is maintained, this sign is
positive.
‡ if cr <c x and cu <c x, this sign is positive.
‡‡ if cr <c x and cu <c x, this sign could become positive if σ was suﬃciently close to ρr and ρu.
‡‡‡ if cr <c x and cu <c x but the negative eﬀect on the wage curve is maintained, this sign is
positive.
Note: If k is proportional to y, the level of the latter does not aﬀect θ nor e.








































Figure 3: The simulated impact of the sanction rate, π, on the steady-state equilibrium

























Figure 4: The simulated impact of the rate of entry into active programs, γ, on the
























Figure 5: The simulated impact of the replacement ratio, ρu, on the steady-state equilib-
rium values of tightness θ and on the employment rate e.
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